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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-2681 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 DANTE G. DIXON, 
 
                                  Appellant  
 _____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 2:13-cr-00806-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 18, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Dante Dixon pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and was sentenced to 
thirty-seven months of imprisonment on April 30, 2014.1  He appeals the judgment of 
sentence, arguing that the District Court erred by varying upward from the offense level 
calculated in his Presentence Report.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court.         
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts that are necessary 
to our disposition.  Dixon and a conspirator impersonated corporate executives to induce 
companies to extend lines of credit to them.  Using this scheme, they received over 
$220,000 in goods and services for which they never paid.  Dixon was caught and pled 
guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud on December 17, 2013, pursuant to a written 
plea agreement. 
 At sentencing, Dixon argued that his criminal history category had been 
incorrectly calculated and argued that a sentence at the bottom of the range prescribed by 
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines was appropriate.  The Government argued that the 
criminal history category was correct and sought a sentence near the top of the Guidelines 
range.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, neither party requested a departure.  
 The District Court considered and rejected Dixon’s argument regarding his 
criminal history, and Dixon does not appeal that decision.  The District Court went on to 
                                              
1 The judgment of sentence was amended twice, for clerical reasons, and the latest, 
operative judgment was entered on May 30, 2014.  App. 8. 
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consider Dixon’s extensive criminal history, including the fact that he had perpetrated 
two fraudulent schemes while on supervised release from an earlier sentence for credit 
card fraud and that Dixon committed the instant offense just before he was set to 
surrender for the second violation of his supervised release.  At sentencing, the District 
Court found that the insufficient deterrent effect of Dixon’s prior sentences, his lack of 
apparent remorse, and the need to protect the public justified a one-point upward 
variance.  Dixon was sentenced to thirty-seven months of imprisonment — the top of the 
Guidelines range given the increased offense level.2  
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review a district court’s sentence for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).   
III. 
 Our review of a criminal sentence proceeds in two steps.  First, we examine 
whether the district court committed a significant procedural error.  Id.  Then we consider 
whether the sentence imposed is substantively reasonable.  Id.  Our responsibility is thus 
“to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally 
fair way.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 Dixon raises claims of both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness.  
On the procedural front, he argues that the District Court failed to consider his “history 
                                              
2 This sentence represented a four-month increase above what would have been the top of 
the Guidelines range had the District Court used the offense level as calculated in the 
Presentence Report. 
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and characteristics,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and that its consideration of the 
other § 3553(a) factors was “cluttered.”  Dixon Br. 6.  It is true that one of the procedural 
requirements for sentencing is that the sentencing court demonstrates “meaningful 
consideration of the relevant statutory factors.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
571–72 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  Also, the sentencing court must “respond to colorable 
arguments with a factual basis in the record.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
224 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Neither of Dixon’s arguments supports the conclusion that the District Court 
committed a procedural error.  The District Court considered Dixon’s history and 
characteristics — it simply did not draw from those considerations the conclusions that 
Dixon would have preferred.  For example, Dixon provided materials related to his 
family circumstances and upbringing.  The District Court considered these materials and 
was troubled by the fact that Dixon committed these crimes in spite of the fact that he had 
a good upbringing and stable family.  Other materials Dixon submitted purporting to 
demonstrate how his “history and characteristics” justified a lower sentence were 
considered in a similar fashion.   
 While the District Court did not draw Dixon’s desired conclusion from these 
submissions, the record clearly demonstrates that all of his submissions were fully 
considered.  Dixon concedes as much in his brief, contending not that the District Court 
failed to review his materials, but rather complaining that it “discredited” his submissions 
when it “could have considered these facts as favorable to him.”  Dixon Br. 9.  This 
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amounts solely to a disagreement with the District Court’s conclusion and does not set 
out a reversible procedural error.  
 As to Dixon’s second point — that the District Court’s analysis was “cluttered” — 
the District Court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  Specifically, the District 
Court considered the seriousness of the offense, the need for specific deterrence, and the 
need to protect the public, and it found that the Guidelines range did not “adequately 
address[] the concerns that [the District Court had] under [the] [§] 3553 factors.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 47.  The sentencing court need not “discuss and make findings as to 
each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into 
account in sentencing.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (quotation marks omitted).  The record 
in this case is clear that the District Court adequately considered all relevant factors in 
imposing sentence and adequately justified the imposition of a small upward variance, 
based primarily on the need to protect the public and the need for increased specific 
deterrence.   
 Dixon also lays out a skeletal argument that his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable, premised on the District Court’s rejection of his “efforts toward post-
offense rehabilitation,” its acknowledgement that the seriousness of the offense standing 
alone might justify a downward variance, and its statement that the enhanced sentence 
might be insufficient to deter Dixon from committing further crimes.  Dixon Br. 10–11.  
“We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable ‘unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
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defendant for the reasons the district court provided.’”  United States v. Handerhan, 739 
F.3d 114, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568).   
 First, the District Court considered Dixon’s claimed efforts at post-offense 
rehabilitation, but found those contentions to “ring hollow,” App. 46, largely because 
Dixon committed crimes while on supervised release in the past.  It reasonably concluded 
that Dixon had likely made similar self-serving claims of being a changed man to other 
sentencing judges and still reoffended.  It also found that he had little genuine remorse, 
which suggests that his claims of post-offense rehabilitation were more opportunistic than 
sincere.  We defer to the sentencing court’s evaluation of Dixon’s credibility as “[t]he 
sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 
3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility 
determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the 
record.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 28, 51 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). 
 Second, the District Court acknowledged that the seriousness of the crime might 
justify a downward departure only if one did not also take into account Dixon’s 
background and criminal history.  The seriousness of the crime is only one of the § 
3553(a) factors, and the sentencing court is required to consider all relevant factors and 
balance competing considerations.  Considering all the relevant factors, as a sentencing 
court is obliged to do, convinced the District Court that a slight upward variance was 
necessary.  See id. (holding that an appellate court must “give due deference to the 
district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 
variance”).  
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 Finally, the District Court’s concern that the enhanced sentence might be 
insufficient to deter Dixon is no reason to overturn it in favor of the imposition of a lower 
sentence.  Considering the record as a whole, Dixon’s sentence was well within the range 
of reasonable sentences, and we certainly cannot conclude that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 538. 
      IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence. 
